low cost: $c < \delta - \delta^2$
medium/low cost: $\delta - \delta^2 < c < \delta$
medium/high cost: $\delta < c < \delta + (n-2)\delta^2/2$
payoff to center:
$3\delta - 3c$
not pairwise stable if
$\delta < c$
Overall payoff:
$6\delta + 6\delta^2 - 6c$
Peripheral players gain indirect benefits
Center player does not account for them
unique nonempty pairwise stable network architecture if
$\delta < c < (\delta + \delta^2 + \delta^3)(1 - \delta^2)$, n = 6
Here's an example, you can play with this example if you like. Let delta be bigger than c and, in this case smaller than delta plus delta squared plus delta cubed, times 1 minus delta squared. six individuals, and there's a unique non-empty pairwise stable network architecture, which looks like this. So it doesn't look like a star, it, it actually looks like a ring or a circle. And the idea here is that each individual is willing to have these other relationships even though c is bigger than delta. So c is higher than delta, but that's because they get indirect benefits from having these. So by having these they, they get indirect benefits as well and that makes it worthwhile and it all hooks together. Nobody wants to add any extra links across because the value of, of adding that link is not worth the cost. It doesn't change the indirect relationships to anybody else but adds an extra cost. And it's not worth shortening that path from a delta cubed to a single one. So this, in this setting you can check is the unique pairwise stable nonempty network and we end up with something that is not a star.